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Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its
emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual
elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are
therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in
advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders,
punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the ‘‘punishment pool’’ from emptying. Failure to do so
renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured
populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree
that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when
punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.
T
he provisioning of social benefits or the preservation of environmental resources relies on selfless contribu-
tions and collaborative efforts
1–4. Those that exploit such public goods are therefore faced with individuals
and institutions that are prepared to sanction antisocial behavior
5–14 with the aim of averting Hardin’s
tragedyofthecommons
15.TheAchilles’heelofpunishment,however,isthefactthatitiscostly,weighingheavily
on the shoulder of those that already fill the common pool
16–20. In the presence of punishers, the traditional
cooperators, i.e., those that contribute to the public good but do not punish, are therefore downgraded to free-
riders as well. This so-called second-order free-riding is in many ways more prohibitive for the emergence and
stability of punishment then the traditional defectors
21–23. Without additional incentives and mechanisms that
help sustain punishment, the second-order free-riders prevail over punishers, thereby eliminating the threat of
sanctioning. In well-mixed populations, volunteering
24–26can cause this unfortunate scenario to unravel
27, as can
coordinated efforts between the punishers
28. However, spatial structure, in contrast to well-mixed interactions,
may alone be sufficient to solve the second-order free-rider problem
29,30.
In spite of the predominantly positive acclaim, studies critically probing the effectiveness of punishment in
promoting collaborative efforts among unrelated and selfish individuals, for example in conjunction with anti-
social punishment
31–33, indirect reciprocity
34 or social differences
35,36, are an important reminder of open ques-
tionsstillimbuingthesubject.Asaviablealternativetopunishment,rewardinghasreceivedsubstantialattention
as well
37–40. Although the majority of previous studies addressing the ‘‘stick versus carrot’’ dilemma concluded
that punishment is more effective than reward in sustaining public cooperation
41, evidence suggesting that
rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead to higher total earnings without potential damage to
reputation
42,43 or fear from retaliation are mounting
44,45.
Here we also depart from the traditional model of punishment by considering it not as an individually in-
spired act, i.e., peer-punishment, but rather as something that is inherent to the population as a whole, i.e., pool-
punishment. Although both variants entail paying a cost for the free-riders to incur a cost, by peer-punishment
this is done after the public goods game and is primarily an individually inspired effort, while by pool-
punishment contributions to the ‘‘punishment pool’’ aresummoned inadvance. Aspointed out in arecent study
bySigmundetal.
46,thefirstexperimentonpublicgoodswithpunishment
47actuallyconsideredpool-ratherthan
peer-punishment. An important advantage of collecting resources for punishment ahead of the collaborative
effort, as in paying towards a sanctioning institution, is the fact that second-order free-riders are easily spotted
andarethussubmissivetobeingpunished.Notethatifeveryonecontributestothepublicgoodthensecond-order
free-riders are not distinguishable from peer-punishers. Pool-punishment alleviates this important deficiency,
and as a reported in
46, can prevail over peer-punishment if second-order free-riders are punished as well.
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48–52)
and entails punishers (P), cooperators (C) and defectors (D) as the
three strategies competing for dominance on the square lattice.
Notably, since we consider structured rather than well-mixed popu-
lations,theoptionofvolunteering
27forstabilizingeithercooperation
or punishment is not required
29. Punishers and cooperators both
contribute equally to the public good. The resulting amount is mul-
tiplied by the synergy factor r . 1 and then divided equally among
the group members irrespective of their strategies. Butwhile punish-
ers contribute an amount b also to the punishment pool, the coop-
erators refrain from doing the same. Due to their second-order free
riding the cooperators are fined an amount dc, where d # 1i sa
multiplication factor taking into account the fact that their offence
is lesser than the one committed by defectors. The latter contribute
neitherto the public good norto the punishment pool and are there-
fore charged for the full amount c.
Since institutions for governing the commons supposedly act as
the ‘‘invisible hand’’ looming over the whole population, the free-
riders are finned irrespective of their neighborhoods, in particular,
irrespective of whether they contain a punisher or not. Likewise,
contributions to the punishment pool are summoned irrespective
of the number of free-riders in the population. This is an import-
ant distinction from previously studied spatial public goods games
incorporating peer-punishment
53–56, where punishing costs and
fines were deducted from payoffs individually on the basis of
strategies that were present in a particular group at a given time.
The non-local character of pool-punishment allows for the intro-
duction of an account balance S for the punishment pool. If the
contributions of all the punishers cover the costs that are need to
punish all the free-riders in the population, i.e., if S $ 0, the pool-
punishment is said to be fully sustainable. Conversely, if S , 0t h e
pool-punishment is unsustainable. Sustainability is key for every
institution to remain in existence, and sanctioning institutions
should be no exception to this assertion. In exceptional cases even
a small amount of punishers, although technically unable to sus-
tain S $ 0, can still ensure enough resources to punish free-riders,
for example by means of lobbying or loans and similar financial
mechanisms. Such situations can be dubbed accordingly as being
conditionally sustainable, and we will make note of them when
presenting the results.
Beforehand, ourmaindiscoveries forasocietyfacingpublicgoods
games with pool-punishment may be summarized as follows. First,
we show that the spatial structure can resolve the second-order free-
rider problem in case of institutionalized punishment. Without any
additional assumptions or strategic complexity, pool-punishers can
fully eliminate cooperators. This happens by means of a discontinu-
ous phase transition leading to an outbreak of sustainability, either
full or conditional, depending further on the punishment fine and
the synergetic effects of collaborative efforts. Second, sustainable
pool-punishment is possible exclusively if second-order free-riders
go extinct. Only beyond the discontinuous phase transition, by
means of which cooperators are eliminated, can the punishers keep
thepunishmentpoolfromemptyingandmaintainapositivebalance.
Importantly though, the elimination of second-order free-riders is
only the necessary but not the sufficient criterion for full sustain-
ability of pool-punishment. For small punishment fines and modest
synergetic effects of collaborative efforts the defectors can still over-
burden the sanctioning institution, leading to a conditionally sus-
tainable state only. Remarkable nevertheless is the fact that by
appropriateconditionsuptohalfofthepopulationmaybedefectors,
and still the pool-punishment remains fully sustainable. This is in
sharp contrast with the fact that even a minute fraction of coopera-
tors precludes sustainable institutionalized punishment, and
strengthens the perception that not the defectors but rather the
second-order free-riders are the ones that compromise the success
of punishment the most.
Results
In the absence of punishment cooperators survive only if r . 3.74,
andcrowdoutdefectorscompletely forr.5.49
48.Thesecanbeused
as benchmark values for evaluating the impact of pool-punishment
on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.
Focusingfirstonther2cparameterplane,wepresentinFig.1full
phase diagrams and the corresponding dependence of the punish-
ment pool balance S for two different values of d. Panels (a) and (b)
featureresultsford51.0,implyingthatsecond-orderfree-ridersare
punished equally strong as defectors. This is a common assumption,
although the offence committed by cooperators, who contribute to
the public good but abstain from punishing, is actually smaller than
the one committed by defectors, who free-ride on both occasions. It
can be observed that below a critical fine c 5 1.0 punishers cannot
survive,andaccordingly,thespatialgridisdominatedbydefectorsor
a mixed C1D phase, depending on the value of r. Since cooperators
and defectors are punished equally, the absence of punishers trans-
forms the public goods game into its traditional two-strategy variant
where the value of c merely rescales the payoffs but does not influ-
encetheoutcome.Inthissense,itcouldbeassumedthatpunishment
is not executed at all if punishers die out without this affecting the
presented results. Accordingly, r 5 3.74
48 is recovered as the critical
synergy factor above which cooperators can survive. For c . 1.0,
however,cooperatorsaresubvertedbypunishersviaadiscontinuous
phase transition. With their emergence, collaborative efforts can be
sustainedalsoforr,3.74,wherebythelargerthefinethesmallerthe
synergy factor needed to achieve this. Pertaining variations in sus-
tainability,evaluatedbymeansofthepunishmentpoolbalanceS,are
depicted in panel (b). The elimination of second-order free-riders is
clearly a necessary condition that needs to be fulfilled for pool-
punishment to be sustainable. In addition, however, the fraction of
defectorsintheP1Dphaseneedstobesufficientlysmall.Theregion
of full sustainability, where S . 0, is delineated with a dash-dotted
gray line, while conditional sustainability characterizes the remain-
der of the P1D phase. There the high fraction of defectors in the
P1D phase precludes positive values of S.
Complying with the proposition that cooperators should be pun-
ished more leniently than defectors, we set d to 0.5, which implies
thatthefineforsecond-orderfree-ridingishalftheonefordefecting.
Results presented in panels (c) and (d) of Fig. 1 qualitatively agree
with those presented for d 5 1.0 in panels (a) and (b). A distinctive
feature is that the critical fine at which the discontinuous phase
transition C 1 D R P 1 D occurs is now two times larger, i.e., c
5 2.0. Borders of conditional and full sustainability move towards
larger c accordingly. It is important to note that in the absence of
cooperators d has no effect on the evolution of the remaining two
strategies. For c . 2.0 the results in panels (c) and (d) are therefore
identical to those presented in panels (a) and (b). Conversely, for
c , 2.0, where punishers cannot survive, the competition between
cooperatorsanddefectors isno longerunaffected bycaswasthis the
case for d 5 1.0. Since here defectors are punished with the full fine
while cooperators with only half of it, larger values of c decrease the
critical synergy factor r that is needed for cooperative behavior to
remain in existence.
Since the discontinuous phase transition C1D R P1D is crucial
for the sustainability of pool-punishment, we proceed by examining
the evolutionary process at both sides of it in detail. Panels (a), (b)
and(c)ofFig.2depictcharacteristicsnapshotsofthespatialgridthat
eventually lead to a stable C1D phase, while panels (e), (f) and (g)
depict snapshots leading to a stable P1D phase. Although the final
outcome in this two cases is remarkably different, the difference in
the fine c that is needed for this to happen is minute, which is a
characteristic feature of a discontinuous phase transition. Results
in panels (d) and (h) illustrate this phenomenon in terms of the
densitiesofpunishersrP(solidgreen)andcooperators(dashedblue)
rC over time. What promises to be an identical evolutionary process
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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slowlydiverges[see(d)and(h)]towardstwoverydifferentbutstable
results.At1000fullMCstepsthesnapshotsalreadyhintdecisivelyin
favorof either the cooperators (b)or thepunishers (f), depending on
the value of c. At 10000 full MC steps the stationary state in both
cases is reached, where the full magnitude of the difference is
revealed.Forc51.99(c)thecooperatorscompletelysubvertpunish-
erstoformastablecoexistencephasewithdefectors(red),whileforc
52.01(g)thepunishersprevailandeliminatethesecond-orderfree-
riders completely. Panel (i) illustrates the workings of the discon-
tinuous phase transition in terms of the punishment pool balance S,
which, after a substantial period of equivalence, turns unsustainable
for c 5 1.99 (dashed orange) and sustainable for c 5 2.01 (solid
yellow).
Different outcomes of the proposed spatial public goods game
with pool-punishment can be understood better still if considering
d and c as the two variable parameters by a given value of r. Figure 3
features the full d – c phase diagram (a) and the corresponding color
encodedstationaryfractionofdefectorsrD(b)forr53.4.Thephase
diagram has a markedly webbed structure, indicating the possibility
of stable pure P, C and D phases, as well as stable mixed P1D and
C1D phases. All but the C1D R P1D phase transition are con-
tinuous, as indicated by the black solid lines. The discontinuous
phase transition is depicted dashed gray, whereby the line corre-
sponds exactly to d 5 b/c, which can be obtained by equating PP
and PC (see Methods). Thus, it implies equivalence of punishers and
cooperators. Above the line punishers should outperform coopera-
tors, while below the line cooperators should prevail. Due to the
locally independent introduction of pool-punishment, this well-
mixed approximation is accurately reproduced by the numerical
simulations of the spatially structured model. Panel (b) features the
pertainingregionsofconditional(dashedgray)andfull(dash-dotted
gray) sustainability. For sufficiently large (small) values of c(d) the d
5 b/c dependence agrees perfectly with the emergence of full sus-
tainability, and thus confirms that the elimination of second-order
free-riders is a necessary condition for institutionalized punishment
to be sustainable. Before reaching the P 1 D R D phase transition
line from above, the pool-punishment becomes conditionally sus-
tainable only (S , 0 and rP . 0), whereby the discontinuous phase
transition on the left still remains an accurate delineator of this
Figure 1 | Phasediagrams(a,c)ofthespatialpublicgoodsgamewithpunishers(P),cooperators(C)anddefectors(D),andtheresultingpoolbalanceS
(b,d)onther2cparameterplane. In(a)and(b)d51.0whilein(c)and(d)d50.5.Blacksolid(dashed)linesdepictcontinuous(discontinuous)phase
transitions. Color mapping in the phase diagrams (a,c) encodes the density of punishers in the P1D region and the density of cooperators in the C1D
region.PurePandDphasesaredepictedredandblue,respectively.In(b)and(d)thecolormapencodesthepunishmentpoolbalanceSpertainingtothe
phase diagrams on the left. The phase separation lines are depicted for reference as well. Gray dash-dotted lines delineate the region of full sustainability,
i.e., S $ 0, while the region where rP . 0 and S , 0 is denoted asconditionally sustainable. Irrespective of d, sufficiently large r and ccan stabilize pool-
punishment by means ofadiscontinuous phase transition at whichpunishers replace cooperatorsinthe coexistence withdefectors (C1 DRP 1D) or
viaacontinuousphasetransitionwhereDRP1D.Ifsecond-orderfree-ridersarepunishedequallystrongasdefectors(a,b)thecriticalfineatwhichthe
discontinuous phase transition occurs is smaller than if cooperators are finned only half as strong as defectors (c,d). Accordingly, in (a) and (b) both
sustainabilityregionsextendfurthertowardssmallerc,albeitshiftingtowardseverlargerraswell.Theemergence oftheP1Dphaseshiftsthesustenance
ofcollaborativeeffortstowardsmallerrascincreases.Thiscanbeobservedbestford51.0,wherethepunishmentofcooperatorsanddefectorsisequally
strong,andhenceintheabsenceofpunisherstheircoexistenceisindependentofc.However,assoonaspunisherssubvertcooperatorsatc51.0bymeans
of a discontinuous phase transition, the cooperative behavior starts existing also for r # 3.74. Qualitatively identical features can be observed for d 5 0.5
(c,d). Results in all panels were obtained for b 5 1.0 and K 5 0.5.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 344 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00344 3Figure 2 | Characteristic snapshots of the square lattice and time courses of strategy densities close to the discontinuous phase transition at c 5 2.0.
Panels (a), (b) and (c), obtained for c 5 1.99, depict snapshots leading to the coexistence of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red). Time courses in (d)
showthepertainingeliminationofpunishers(green)attheexpenseofsecond-orderfree-riders(dashedblue).Justontheothersideofthediscontinuous
phasetransition, atc52.01, panels(e), (f)and(g)depictsnapshots leadingtothe coexistence ofpunishers (green) anddefectors (red).Accordingly, the
twotimecoursesin(h)showthepertainingeliminationofsecond-orderfree-riders(dashedblue)attheexpenseofpunishers(green).Panel(i)depictsthe
timeevolutionofthepunishmentpoolbalance Sforc51.99(dashedorange)andc52.01(yellow)towardsunsustainability (S,0)andsustainability
(S.0),respectively.Snapshotsweretakenat100(a,e),1000(b,f)and10000(c,g)fullMonteCarlo(MC)steps.Notethatat60.01distanceinthevalueof
c from the discontinues phase transitions the system can actually be considered as being far away from it. Setting c an order of magnitude closer to the
transition point would prolong the equilibration time dramatically. The horizontal axis in (d,i,h) is logarithmic. Results in all panels were obtained for
r 5 4.0, d 5 0.5, b 5 1.0 and K 5 0.5.
Figure 3 | Phase diagram (a) of the spatial public goodsgame with punishers (P), cooperators (C) and defectors (D), and the corresponding density of
defectors(b)onthed2cparameterplane. In(a)blacksolidlinesdepictcontinuousphasetransitions.Dashedgraylinedepictstheanalyticallypredicted
c 5 b/d discontinuous phase transition line, which agrees perfectly with the numerical results. Color mapping encodes the density of punishers in the
P1DregionandthedensityofcooperatorsintheC1Dregion.PurePandDphasesaredepictedredandblue,respectively.In(b)thecolormapencodes
thestationarydensityofdefectorspertainingtothephasediagramontheleft.Graydash-dottedlinedelineatestheregionoffullsustainability,i.e.,S$0,
whiletheregionrP.0andS,0isdenotedasconditionallysustainableanddelineatedwithdashedgray.Notethatdefectorsneednotdieoutcompletely
forpool-punishmenttobefullysustainable. Remarkably,intheabsence ofsecond-order free-riders asmuch ashalfofthe latticemaystillbeoccupied by
defectors when S $ 0. Results were obtained for r 5 3.4, b 5 1.0 and K 5 0.5.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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appropriate conditions up to half of the lattice my be occupied by
defectors and still S remains positive. This is in stark contrast with
the fact that even a minute fraction of cooperators precludes the
possibility of sustainable institutionalized punishment, and leads to
the conclusion that not the defectors but rather the second-order
free-riders are the ones most prohibitive for its success.
Discussion
Over-fishing, environmental pollution, depletion of natural
resources, or the misuse of social security systems, are prime exam-
ples of the exploitation of public goods. We as humans, although
being notoriously famous for cooperative behavior, are also likewise
famous for exceeding resources that are readily available to us, des-
pite the fact that later generations may pay for our misbehavior
greatly. Identifying what works most efficiently in leading us away
from antisocial behavior is therefore of the outmost importance.
Punishment, either peer or pool based, is weaved in our history
records as something that can foster collaborative efforts and keeps
our egos in check. However, in the light of pro-social behavior,
punishment can be regarded as just another public good that needs
ourselflesssidetoshinethrough.Howandwhypunishmentemerges
and can be stabilized appears therefore to be a translation of above-
mentionedproblemsintoasingleone,whichifeffectivelysolved,will
solvealsoalltheotherones.Yetitisafruitfulandgratifyingapproach
allowing us to capture the essence of the problem and investigate,
primarily by means of minimalist but relevant models, the hows and
whys of the evolution of cooperation and social norms
57–59.
Here we have demonstrated that such a model can explain the
emergence and stability of institutionalized punishment. In particu-
lar, we have shown that the elimination of second-order free-riders
through spatially structured interactions paves the way for sustain-
able pool-punishment if accompanied by sufficiently large fines and
synergeticeffectsofcooperation.Second-orderfreeridersarethereby
eliminated by means of a discontinuous phase transition that shifts
the evolution rather explosively in favor of the punishers. Although
this discontinuity is due to the simplified assumption of uncon-
ditional punishment, and partially contradicts with real-life experi-
ence in that it prohibits a stable coexistence of second-order
free-riders and punishers, it nevertheless outlines a succinct and
viable solution of the second-order free-rider problem that is in line
with recent advances
46. Altogether, the presented results strengthen
the established importance of the spatial structure in promoting
collaborative efforts
60–62 as well as in stabilizing punishment
29,53,
and suggest that elaborating further on the particularities of pool-
punishment in structured populations, especially with methods of
statistical physics
63,64, may improve our understanding of the origin
of institutions.
Methods
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions. Players play the game with their k 5 4 nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each
individual belongs to five different groups containing five players each. Initially each
player on site x is designated either as a punisher (sx 5 P), cooperator (sx 5 C) or
defector (sx 5 D) with equal probability. Using standard parametrization, the two
cooperating strategies P and C contribute 1 to the public good while defectors con-
tributenothing.Thesumofallcontributionsineachgroupismultipliedbythefactor
r . 1, reflecting the synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount is
equally divided among the k 1 1 members irrespective of their strategies.
Pool-punishment requires allocating resources by means of which free-riders can
subsequently be punished. Each punisher therefore contributes an amount b to the
punishment pool that is subtracted from its payoff. Since the resources for pool-
punishment are actually committed before the collaborative effort, both free-rider
types are exposed. Cooperators, whose second-order free-riding can stay undetected
bypeer-punishment,arespottedjustasreadilyasthedefectors.Theamountwithheld
from the common pool by defectors is, however, larger than the one withheld by
cooperators. To take this into account and enable ‘‘fair punishing’’, each defector is
punished with a full fine c, while the fine for second-order offenders is reduced by a
multiplication factor d # 1. Denoting the number of punishers (P), cooperators (C)
and defectors (D) in a given group g by NP, NC and ND, respectively, the payoffs
P
g
P~ rN PzNC ðÞ {b ½  = kz1 ðÞ {1,
P
g
C~ rN PzNC ðÞ {dc ½  = kz1 ðÞ {1 and
P
g
D~ rN PzNC ðÞ {c ½  = kz1 ðÞ
are obtained by each player x depending on its strategy sx. Since pool-punishment
correspondstoaninstitutionalizedsystemthatoperatespopulation-wideirrespective
oflocalconsiderations,thecostsandfinesaresubtractedfromtheappropriateplayers
irrespective of their neighborhoods. This unconditional execution of punishment
takes into account the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of justice looming over the free-riders.
Althoughbeingasimplification(foranalternativetreatmentsee
65),itaccountsforthe
fact that the same effect is missing by peer-punishment, where the threatening
omnipresence of a sanctioning institution is absent and the execution of punishment
is therefore neighborhood-dependent. However, since punishers contributing to the
punishment pool may not be strong enough in numbers to actually gather enough
resources to punish all the free-riders in a population, the necessity to assess the
sustainabilityofpool-punishmentemerges.TheaccountbalanceS5brP2c(drC1
rD) of the punishment pool is thus defined, where rsx are the stationary fractions of
strategies on the L 3 L square lattice. If S $ 0 the pool has a zero or positive balance,
and thus the pool-punishment is said to be sustainable. Conversely, if S , 0 the
resources needed to execute punishment exceed the contributions to the pool, and
accordingly, the pool-punishment is unsustainable. It is also possible to argue that
even a small amount of punishers can still ensure enough resources to punish free-
riders. Situations where rP . 0 and S , 0 can be referred to appropriately as being
conditionally sustainable.
The stationary fractions of punishers rP, cooperators rC and defectors rD on the
squarelatticearedeterminedbymeansofarandomsequentialupdatecomprisingthe
following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x plays the public goods
game with its k interaction partners as a member of all the g 5 1, …, 5 groups it
belongsto. Theoverall payoffittherebyobtainsisthusPsx~
P
g P
g
sx.Next, oneofthe
fournearestneighborsofplayerxischosenrandomly,anditslocationisdenotedbyy.
Player y also acquires its payoff Psy identically as previously player x. Finally, player y
imitatesthestrategyofplayerxwiththeprobabilityq~1
 
1zexp Psy{Psx
    
K
     
,
where K determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions or its inverse K
21
the so-called intensity of selection
66. In the K R 0 limit player y unconditionally
imitates player xif PsywPsx.Conversely, in the K R‘limit all information aboutthe
payoffs is lost and player y changes its strategy by means of a coin toss. Without the
lossof generality weset K 50.5
48,implyingthat better performing players are readily
imitated, but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performing worse.
Such errors in judgment can be attributed to mistakes and external influences that
affect the evaluation of the opponent. Each full Monte Carlo (MC) step involves all
players having a chance to adopt a strategy from one of their neighbors once on
average.Dependingontheproximitytophasetransitionpoints,thelinearsystemsize
variedfromL5200to1600andtheequilibrationrequiredupto10
6fullMCstepsfor
the finite size effects to be avoided.
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